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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 10-1992 
______________ 
 
TOM LOCKHART, 
 
         Appellant 
 
v. 
 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY 
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2:08-cv-00993) 
Honorable Terrence F. McVerry, District Judge 
______________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 17, 2010 
 
BEFORE:  SLOVITER, GREENAWAY, JR., and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed:  February 8, 2011) 
______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This matter comes on before this Court on plaintiff Tom Lockhart’s appeal from 
an order of the District Court entered on March 17, 2010, involving claims for breach of 
contract and bad faith refusal to provide insurance coverage for a property loss that 
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Lockhart claims to have suffered.  The District Court entered the order in favor of 
Lockhart’s insurer, defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 
dismissing, on Lockhart’s motion, his breach of contract claim after the Court on 
February 16, 2010, granted State Farm summary judgment on Lockhart’s bad faith claim.  
The Court entered the order of February 16, 2010, to implement its memorandum opinion 
of that day in which, though it granted State Farm summary judgment on Lockhart’s bad 
faith claim, it denied State Farm summary judgment on his breach of contract claim.  
Lockhart explains in his brief that he sought entry of the March 17, 2010 order to make 
the February 16, 2010 order, which granted summary judgment against him on his bad 
faith claim, final and appealable.
1
  Consequently, the appeal really is from the order of 
February 16, 2010, on the bad faith claim.    
 The District Court had jurisdiction in this diversity of citizenship action under 
Pennsylvania law, removed from a Pennsylvania state court under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and 
we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  The parties agree that Pennsylvania law 
governs this action.  We exercise plenary review over the order for summary judgment 
and thus can affirm only if “the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, 
and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
                                              
1
 The March 17, 2010 order did not make the February 16, 2010 order appealable because 
the District Court entered the March 17, 2010 order under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2) and 
did not dismiss the case with prejudice.  See Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950 (3d 
Cir. 1976) (per curiam).  But on March 18, 2010, on State Farm’s motion, the Court 
modified the March 17, 2010 order so that the dismissal on March 17, 2010, was with 
prejudice.  At that point Lockhart could appeal from the February 16, 2010 order. 
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movant [State Farm] is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56;  see    
Santos ex rel. Beato v. United States, 559 F.3d 189, 193 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 The District Court set forth the facts of the case in detail in its memorandum 
opinion of February 16, 2010, and thus we need not repeat them at length.  It is sufficient 
to recite that Lockhart owned a 2006 Dodge Ram Pickup Truck that State Farm insured 
against theft and that Lockhart claimed that an unknown person stole the vehicle on May 
20, 2007.  It is undisputed that the vehicle has not been recovered.  The State Farm policy 
included standard provisions providing that there would not be coverage if the vehicle 
was stolen “by or at the direction of an Insured” or if the insured “made false statements 
with the intent to conceal or misrepresent any material fact or circumstance in connection 
with any claim under [the] policy.”  App. at 514-15.   
 Following the theft, Lockhart made a claim on his State Farm policy for the loss 
that he attributed to the theft.  State Farm, however, after investigation, rejected the claim 
as fraudulent for it did not believe that someone had stolen the vehicle without Lockhart’s 
knowledge.  Lockhart then initiated this action. 
 After our review of this matter we are in full accord with the order and opinion of 
the District Court granting summary judgment to State Farm on Lockhart’s bad faith 
claim.  We, however, make the following comments about the case.  Lockhart brought 
the bad faith aspect of this action under Pennsylvania’s bad faith statute, 42 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. Ann. § 8371 (West 1998).  Although the statute does not define “bad faith,” the 
Pennsylvania courts have defined that term in numerous opinions.  Therefore, not 
surprisingly, the parties agree on the legal standards governing this action.    
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 Pennsylvania case law makes it clear that a party seeking to prove a bad faith 
claim must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the insurance company acted 
in bad faith without a reasonable basis for denying the claim, and that it knowingly or 
recklessly disregarded its lack of a reasonable basis to do so.  Accordingly, to establish 
that the insurer acted in bad faith the insured must demonstrate that the insurance 
company acted frivolously with a dishonest purpose and breached its known duty.  See, 
e.g., Nordi v. Keystone Health Plan West Inc., 989 A.2d 376, 384 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010); 
Brickman Grp., Ltd v. CGU Ins. Co., 865 A.2d 918, 930 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004).  Our 
cases, appropriately following Pennsylvania law, set forth the same standards for a 
Pennsylvania bad faith action.  See, e.g., W.V. Realty Inc. v. Northern Ins. Co., 334 F.3d 
306, 312 (3d Cir. 2003); Polselli v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 747, 751-52 
(3d Cir. 1994).  Here, the District Court’s comprehensive analysis led it to conclude that 
the record could not support a finding that State Farm acted in bad faith and, exercising 
plenary review, we agree with that conclusion. 
 Lockhart predicates his challenge to the District Court’s conclusions on two bases.  
First, he contends that the Court dismissed his bad faith claim because it made a 
credibility determination that it believed State Farm’s purported reasons for its denial of 
his claim even though there was evidence supporting a conclusion that State Farm 
rejected his claim for other reasons.  In particular, Lockhart views the record as 
supporting a conclusion that State Farm “was denying [his] claim out of spite for a claim 
that it had paid four years prior.”  Appellant’s br. at 16.  Lockhart’s earlier claim was 
similar to the one involved here as he made it to recover for the loss that he claimed to 
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have suffered when he reported that a vehicle he owned and State Farm insured had been 
stolen.  Thus, Lockhart contends that State Farm acted in bad faith in rejecting his current 
claim and that there was a genuine dispute of material fact on the summary judgment 
motion.  Therefore, he argues that the Court should not have granted summary judgment 
against him.   
 Lockhart’s second challenge to the summary judgment is that the District Court 
erred because it disregarded the report of his expert witness, Robert Garvin, that Lockhart 
submitted to the Court in opposition to State Farm’s summary judgment motion.  
Garvin’s report included his opinion that State Farm did not have a legitimate reason to 
deny Lockhart’s claim and that it was motivated to do so in retribution for having paid 
Lockhart’s prior claim.  Thus, Lockhart’s second challenge is related to his first 
challenge.  We review the Court’s treatment of Garvin’s report for an abuse of discretion.  
See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 138-39, 118 S.Ct. 512, 515 (1997). 
 Lockhart’s objections are not meritorious.  In support of his contention that State 
Farm acted out of spite, Lockhart points to an internal State Farm communication in 
which its author indicated that he could not “reward another fraudulent claim from 
[Lockhart].”  App. at 38.  It is difficult to understand why Lockhart believes that this 
communication shows that State Farm acted out of spite in denying his current claim.  
Though we do not doubt that State Farm was annoyed because it had paid the earlier 
claim that it had come to believe was fraudulent, its internal communication demonstrates 
in unmistakable terms that it believed that Lockhart’s current claim was fraudulent.  
Accordingly, inasmuch as there were objective reasons for State Farm to challenge 
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Lockhart’s current claim to which the District Court referred in its opinion and which we 
need not repeat, State Farm did not act in bad faith when it rejected the claim. 
 Moreover, we see no reason to conclude that the District Court should have given 
Garvin’s report any weight when making its decision.  A court considering a bad faith 
claim on a summary judgment motion should determine whether the facts of the case 
could demonstrate that the insurance company acted in bad faith in refusing to pay the 
claim.  The Court here did consider the facts and then came to the conclusion that they 
could not support a conclusion that State Farm acted in bad faith.  As we have indicated, 
we have come to the same conclusion and, in reaching our conclusion, we do not make 
any credibility determinations.   
 We, of course, realize that under Fed. R. Evid. 702 “[i]f scientific, technical, or 
other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert of knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise,” 
provided that there is a foundation for his testimony.  Yet the District Court, and we for 
that matter, no more was assisted by Garvin’s opinion on the bad faith issue than a court 
when considering a motion to suppress evidence seized in a search pursuant to a warrant 
would be assisted by expert testimony on the issue of whether the court that issued the 
search warrant had probable cause to do so.   
 For the foregoing reasons and for the reasons the District Court set forth in its 
February 12, 2010 opinion, the orders of February 16, 2010, and March 17, 2010,  as 
modified on March 18, 2010, will be affirmed. 
